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THE NEW GLOBAL FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE: 
WHY EGREGIOUS INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATE FRAUD SHOULD BE 
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CLAIMS ACT 
JOEL SLAWOTSKY* 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)1 has been 
invoked in a wide range of settings against an array of foreign and 
domestic corporations and individuals.2  An extremely controversial 
statute,3 the ATCA allows aliens to file suit for international law 
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 1. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 2. See, e.g., Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (discussing claims against 
the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization for bombings in Kenya); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 
932 (9th Cir. 2002) (alleging that oil company defendant aided and abetted murder, torture, and 
enslavement of pipeline workers in Myanmar); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, No. 01 Civ. 8118 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 9, 2005) (discussing suit against pharmaceutical corporation conducting clinical trials in 
Nigeria); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 361 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (examining claims for 
alleged torture in Iraqi prisons); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing Vietnamese plaintiffs’ allegations of chemical company defendant 
liability for injuries related to Agent Orange usage in the Vietnam war); In re S. African 
Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (examining suit against financial 
institutions for purported collaboration with apartheid regime in South Africa). 
 3. See, e.g.,  In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (“[T]his court must be 
extremely cautious in permitting suits here based upon a corporation’s doing business in 
countries with less than stellar human rights records, especially since the consequences of such 
an approach could have significant, if not disastrous, effects on international commerce.”).  See 
also Recent Cases, Civil Procedure—Choice of Law—Ninth Circuit Uses International Law to 
Decide Substantive Law Under Alien Tort Claims Act, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1531 (2003) 
(noting that expansive ATCA liability “could strike deeply at the ability of parties to organize 
their conduct and protect their expectations”); John E. Howard, Op-Ed., The Alien Tort Claims 
Act: Is Our Litigation-Run-Amok Going Global?, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Oct. 2002, 
http://www.uschamber.com/press/opeds/0210howarditigation.htm (discussing business 
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violations in federal court.4  However, only international law 
violations5 reflecting a mutual concern of the nations of the world are 
cognizable under the ATCA.6 
In a significant ATCA ruling, IIT v. Vencap, the Second Circuit 
held that corporate fraud was not a violation of an international 
norm, and was therefore not a cognizable tort under the ATCA.7  
According to Vencap and the subsequent decisions that have cited to 
Vencap as precedent, while commercial fraud is a form of “stealing,” 
it fails to constitute conduct condemned by the majority of nations. 8 
Thus, according to Vencap and its progeny, corporate fraud may 
constitute a several concern of some nations, but not the required 
joint concern of most countries. 
However, in 1975 when Vencap was decided, the global financial 
landscape was vastly different.  The interconnection between 
international equity and debt markets was limited.  Derivatives9 were 
in their nascent stage and posed relatively little risk to the world 
economy.10  The instantaneous movement of capital with a mouse 
click was non-existent.  Globalization was proceeding, but at a slower 
 
community’s concern that the ATCA is potentially damaging to international business and is 
subject to litigation abuse). 
 4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 5. See, e.g., Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that 
violations of international law can be based either on a treaty or a norm of international law). 
 6. Id. at 888 (“It is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong 
is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express international accords, that a 
wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation within the meaning of the 
statute.”). 
 7. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 8. As recently as 2004, courts have relied upon Vencap as authority that corporate fraud is 
not cognizable.  See, e.g., Arndt v. Union Bank of Switz., 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
 9. Derivatives are financial contracts designed to create pure price exposure to an 
underlying commodity, asset, rate, index, or event.  See Investorwords.com, Derivative 
Definition, http://www.investorwords.com/1421/derivative.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2006), for a 
definition of “derivatives.” 
 10. Legendary billionaire Warren Buffett and his partner, Charlie Munger, have warned 
that the widespread usage of derivatives may cause a severe international economic crisis.  See 
Christopher Edmonds, Opinion, Buffett: Expect 6%-7% Returns From the Market, 
THESTREET.COM, May 3, 2003,  http://www.thestreet.com/_yahoo/comment/chrisedmonds/ 
10084972.html; see also Martin Mayer, The Danger of Derivatives, WALL ST. J, May 20, 1999, at 
A20 (“[D]erivatives—created, sold and serviced behind closed doors by consenting adults who 
don’t tell anybody what they’re doing—are also a major source of the almost unlimited leverage 
that brought the world financial system to the brink of disaster last fall.”). 
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pace.11  Concerns about international financing of terrorism and 
money laundering were minimal at best.12  The potential financial 
losses and damage to global economic order arising from a financial 
implosion caused by fraud were modest and more significantly, were 
containable to the local economy or immediate geographic area 
where the collapse occurred.  Given the realities of 1975, there was no 
international consensus, let alone cooperation, regarding the 
prevention of financial fraud. 
Thirty years later, the world financial landscape is completely 
unrecognizable.  National economies and capital markets are 
intertwined,13 and a financial fiasco leading to severe financial loss can 
have catastrophic effects around the world, both directly and 
indirectly.14  While in 1975 financial deception leading to collapse 
might have been disastrous for a particular local or regional economy, 
today’s financial implosion could cause huge losses on an 
international scale.  For example, the amount of outstanding 
derivatives contracts traded over the counter totaled approximately 
$10 trillion by the close of 2005.15  By the end of the first quarter of 
2006, the amount of outstanding derivatives contracts traded on 
formal exchanges totaled $25 trillion and over $50 trillion for options 
 
 11. Notwithstanding the perception that globalization is a new phenomenon, globalization 
has been progressing for hundreds of years.  See generally Michael D. Bordo et al., Is 
Globalization Today Really Different than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago?  (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7195, 1999). 
 12. Recent terrorist atrocities have raised the level of concern regarding the financing of 
terrorism.  Kevin J. Fandl, Recalibrating The War on Terror by Enhancing Development 
Practices in the Middle East, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 299, 299 (2006) (“Only recently, with 
the attacks on the United States, Spain, and the United Kingdom, has the awareness of 
terrorism in the Western world intensified.”).  See also International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature Jan. 10, 2000, 2178 U.N.T.S. 
229, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000) (showing a U.N. convention regarding financing of terrorist activities); 
Financing Terrorism Looking in the Wrong Places, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2005, 
http://economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5053373. 
 13. See, e.g., John W. Head, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of the IMF 
and the United States, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 70, 89-90 (1998) (“[E]conomic collapse in any 
Asian country . . . is bad news for the rest of Asia and potentially for the rest of the world.”). 
 14. See Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords As Soft Law: Strengthening International 
Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1998) (“[O]ne attendant risk arising from the 
growth of financial globalization is the potential for international financial crises which disrupt 
macroeconomic performance.”).  
 15. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL 
BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS statistical annex at A103, tbl.19 (Sept. 
2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa0609.pdf. 
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on those contracts.16  The leverage in the global economy, and thus 
the attendant risk thereto, is staggering. 
Given the profound changes in the international financial 
markets, as well as the growing recognition that fraud poses a danger 
to global financial stability, this Article suggests that automatically 
holding financial fraud not cognizable pursuant to the ATCA is no 
longer valid given the new reality of our interwoven capital markets.  
Avoiding massive corporate fraud is not merely one nation’s interest, 
but rather a crucial foundation underpinning the international 
economic structure.  Preventing “Enron-like” financial implosions, 
failed banking systems, evisceration of tens of billions in market 
value, substantial job loss, destruction of employees’ retirement 
savings, plummeting real estate valuations, and economic collapse 
caused by corporate fraud constitutes the quintessential example of 
an international norm.  Therefore, select egregious corporate fraud 
that results in severe financial collapse, economic damage, and wealth 
destruction is a violation of an international norm, and should be 
actionable under the ATCA.17 
I.  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FINANCIAL 
LANDSCAPE AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION SINCE 
VENCAP 
A. Globalization and the Rise of the Multinational Corporation 
The dangers to the international economy associated with a 
financial fiasco dwarf the dangers formerly present in the 1970s, or 
even the 1980s.  It is incontrovertible that the global economy in the 
opening decade of the twenty-first century bears little resemblance to 
the one in 1975 when Vencap was decided.  Three decades post-
Vencap, business is conducted on a hitherto unimaginable scale.  
Commercial enterprises operate globally, developing cutting-edge 
technology,18 searching for new sources of raw materials,19 testing 
 
 16. Id. statistical annex at A108, tbl.23A. 
 17. This Article is not suggesting that garden-variety acts of fraud such as insider trading, 
executive compensation abuse, or other criminal action, which does not result in serious damage 
to the world economy, should be cognizable.  The conduct suggested to be cognizable is 
egregious deception resulting in severe wealth evisceration. 
 18. See, e.g., Intel, Intel in Your Community: Israel, http://www.intel.com/community/ 
israel/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) (noting development of Intel Corporation’s Centrino Chip at 
its research center in Haifa, Israel). 
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products,20 outsourcing professional services,21 and operating 
production facilities.22 
Standing at the vanguard of this world with virtual borders are 
large international titans of capitalism, including large multinational 
corporations (MNCs) based in the United States.23  With ever-
advancing technology,24 instantaneous movement of capital,25 and the 
explosion of trade markets,26 these huge MNCs have created a new 
financial dynamic facilitating unprecedented economic growth and 
transformation.  MNCs are at the pinnacle of our new global 
economy and enjoy staggering financial power.27  As corporations 
 
 19. See, e.g., China National Petroleum Corporation, Overseas Oil and Gas Operations, 
http://www.cnpc.com.cn/english/inter/OverseasOil.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) (explaining 
how China’s large oil corporations are vigorously searching around the globe in order to find 
new sources of crude oil, and noting that China’s National Petroleum Company has oil 
exploration projects worldwide). 
 20. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 01 Civ. 8118, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005) (discussing an ATCA suit involving an American pharmaceutical 
corporation that conducted clinical trials in Nigeria during a meningitis outbreak). 
 21. See, e.g., About Outside Counsel, www.outsidecounsel.net/about.html (last visited Aug. 
7, 2006) (showing how legal services for U.S. corporations are being performed overseas). 
 22. See, e.g., Nikebiz.com, Jobs: Asia Pacific, http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml? 
page=33 (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) (showing that Nike offers job opportunities in production 
facilities throughout Asia). 
 23. Unquestionably, large MNCs are becoming more powerful and influential.  However, 
over-regulation of MNCs risks severe economic opportunity loss for the MNCs, the local 
population, and the global economy.  See Vijay K. Nagaraj & Nithya V. Raman, Are We 
Prepared for Another Bhopal? (Dec. 2004), http://www.india-seminar.com/2004/544/544% 
20nagaraj,%20raman.htm (“[O]ver-regulation of multinational corporations can drive away 
investment, reducing the wealth of the nation and the number of available jobs.”); see also 
Curtis Bradley, The Costs of Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 471-73 (2001) 
(noting that expansive MNC liability endangers U.S. business interests). 
 24. According to technology experts, 4G describes an environment where radio access 
methods will be able to inter-operate to provide communications sessions that can seamlessly 
“hand-off” between them.  More than any other technology, 4G will have a profound impact on 
the entire wireless landscape.  See, e.g., 4G.co.uk, About 4G, http://www.4g.co.uk/about4g.html 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2006); see also Wireless Week, http://www.wirelessweek.com (last visited on 
Aug. 7, 2006) (breaking the latest technology news). 
 25. See, e.g., TD Ameritrade, http://www.tdameritrade.com (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) 
(noting that capital can be transferred between banks and brokerage accounts with a mouse 
click and large amounts of capital can be invested in specialized exchange traded funds, 
American depository receipts, and single country mutual funds). 
 26. See Press Release, World Trade Org., Developing Countries’ Goods Trade Share 
Surges to 50-Year Peak (Apr. 14, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/ 
pr401_e.htm (“[D]eveloping countries saw their share in world merchandise trade rise sharply in 
2004 to 31%, the highest percentage since 1950, according to WTO figures released on 14 April 
2005.”). 
 27. See Stephen G. Wood & Brett G. Scharffs, Applicability of Human Rights Standards to 
Private Corporations: An American Perspective, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. SUP. 531, 538-39 (2002) 
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have become larger, any MNC mega-meltdown will potentially cause 
substantially more severe financial losses, both locally and globally 
than in 1975. 
B. Globalized Financial Markets, Technological Innovation, and the 
Internet—The New Autobahn of Commerce 
Along with massive opportunities, the risk of a global financial 
meltdown is higher now than ever before because of our autobahn 
global economy.  Thirty years after Vencap, new information systems 
permit real-time gathering and dissemination of information twenty-
four hours a day, seven days a week.  Commercial internet 
transactions, e-payment systems, and other technological innovations 
were unknown when Vencap was decided.  New technology and 
products that enable both business and individuals to communicate 
and conduct business faster, invest globally, retrieve and disseminate 
information, and link the world, are released with increasing 
frequency.28 
One of the most affected areas of the global financial system has 
been financial services and investment.  Technology and globalization 
have united to produce new financial trading centers which bridge the 
time zone gaps between traditional trading centers.29  The proposed 
$20 billion “merger of equals” between the New York Stock 
Exchange and Euronext will create the world’s first global stock 
exchange which is anticipated to trade companies with a combined 
$27 trillion market capitalization.30  The new stock exchange, an MNC 
in its own right, will have offices in New York, London, Paris, and 
Amsterdam.31 
 
(noting that as of the early 1990s about thirty-seven thousand MNCs existed, and that the gross 
sales of several MNCs exceeded the GDPs of many nations); Bruce Mazlish, Perspectives on 
Globalization from Developing States: A Tour of Globalization, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
5, 12 (1999) (“[M]ultinationals are wealthier than about 120-130 nation-State members of the 
United Nations.”). 
 28. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Technology, http://www.nytimes.com/pages/technology/ (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2006) (showcasing examples of new technology and products). 
 29. See, e.g., Gold Lifts Trading on Bourse, GULF DAILY NEWS (Bahr.), Aug. 7, 2006, 
available at http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/arc_printnews.asp?Article=151825 (noting that 
Dubai has opened a gold trading market which bridges the time gap between the Far East and 
London gold trading). 
 30. News Release, NYSE Group, NYSE Group and Euronext N.V. Agree to a Merger of 
Equals (June 1, 2006), http://www.nyse.com/press/1149157439121.html. 
 31. Id. (“NYSE Euronext will be a U.S. holding company, the shares of which will be listed 
on the NYSE, trading in U.S. dollars, and on Euronext Paris, trading in Euros.  Its U.S. 
headquarters will be located in New York, and its international headquarters in Paris and 
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Cutting-edge breakthroughs in technology and pioneering 
advances in investment possibilities have combined to transform and 
add significant leverage in the world financial markets.  The huge 
derivatives market,32 as well as the newer contracts for difference 
(CFDs),33 are examples of this incredible leverage.  New financial 
market innovations permit the buying and selling of both debt and 
equity via electronic communication networks (ECNs).34  Today, large 
amounts of capital can be instantaneously transferred in and out of a 
variety of investment vehicles.35  Not only is there a wide array of 
shares to buy and sell on formal exchanges and the over-the-counter 
markets, but a virtual galaxy of exchange traded funds, or ETFs,36 also 
exist. These investment vehicles focus on single themes such as 
country-specific or region-specific equity indexes, oil, gold, and 
numerous other categories.  They have attracted gargantuan sums of 
capital since their recent introduction.  By June 2006, over $335 
billion in assets were invested in U.S. ETFs.37  At the end of March 
2006, nearly $300 billion was invested in U.S. closed-end funds.38  
Worldwide, nearly $20 trillion was invested in mutual funds.39 
 
Amsterdam (which will be the centers of operations for its international activities), with London 
as the centre for its derivatives business.”). 
 32. See, e.g., supra note 16 and accompanying text (referencing the $75 trillion worth of 
outstanding derivatives contracts and options on those contracts). 
 33. CFDs are “contracts for difference” that allow investors to make very highly leveraged 
bets on various financial products including shares, foreign exchange, precious metals, and 
bonds.  See Contracts for Difference and CFD Trading, http://www.contracts-for-
difference.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2006); see also GCI Financial, http://www.gcitrading.com/ 
cfd-trading.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) (showing an example of where CFDs are traded). 
 34. Many ECNs allow trading after-hours and sometimes even for twenty-four hours.  Most 
of these ECN systems were not created until the late 1990s.  See, e.g., Instinet, 
http://www.instinet.com/index2.jsp (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); NASDAQTrader.com, 
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com; Bloomberg.com, http://www.bloomberg.com/index.html?Intro= 
intro2 (last visited Oct. 26, 2006). 
 35. For example, according to the U.S. Treasury, “the two [major] international electronic 
funds transfer systems handle over $6 trillion in wire transfers” daily.  United States 
Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, International Overview, 
http://www.fincen.gov/int_main.html (last visited June 20, 2006). 
 36. ETFs are “a type of investment company whose investment objective is to achieve the 
same return as a particular market index.”  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Exchange-Traded Funds, http://www.sec.gov/answers/etf.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006). 
 37. Exchange-Traded Fund Assets: June 2006, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, July 27, 
2006, http://www.ici.org/stats/etf/etfs_06_06.html #TopOfPage. 
 38. Closed-End Fund Assets: First Quarter 2006, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, June 
6, 2006, http://www.ici.org/stats/latest/cef_q1_06.html#TopOfPage. 
 39. See Worldwide Mutual Fund Assets and Flows: First Quarter 2006, INVESTMENT 
COMPANY INSTITUTE, Aug. 3, 2006, http://www.ici.org/stats/latest/ww_03_06.html#TopOfPage. 
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In addition to the investment choices in “traditional markets,”40 
investment options in countries that were once unthinkable are now 
rapidly developing.  In 1975, there was a cold war between the former 
Soviet Union and the United States.  Thirty years after Vencap there 
is substantial free-market development in Russia as well as the former 
“Eastern Bloc” and both equity and debt markets in these formerly 
communist nations are undergoing rapid development.41  China has 
also opened its doors, and the “Great Wall” is rapidly becoming the 
“Great Mall.”42 
Both the potential rewards and risks have become magnified as a 
result of the financial and technological revolutions that have 
overtaken the world equity, debt, and forex markets.  While the 
dangers associated with market risk may be assuaged through 
prudent hedging or insurance, the risk associated with financial 
collapse due to a grandiose fraud cannot be underestimated. 
II.  THE SECULAR BULL MARKET IN FINANCIAL FRAUD 
AND SCANDAL 
A. The “Old” Financial Fraud 
Although corporate fraud has occurred in prior decades, these 
early deceptions generally did not have significant potential to cause 
widespread international financial turmoil.  For example, in the 1970s, 
several Wall Street firms collapsed due to “technological 
incompetence and lack of capital.”43  In the 1980s, the phrase “greed is 
good”44 became a generational symbol for insider trading scandals, 
including the crumbling of Drexel Burnham Lambert and the Savings 
and Loan scandal.45  However, as globalization grew in the 1990s, the 
 
 40. Examples of traditional markets are the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, 
Continental Europe, and Japan. 
 41. See, e.g., Russian Trading System Stock Exchange, http://www.rts.ru/?tid=541 (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2006). 
 42. See Pepe Escobar, The Great Wall of Shopping, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (H.K.), Jan. 14, 
2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GA14Ad04.html. 
 43. Gretchen Morgenson, Rebound from Ruin, If Not from Distrust, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 
2002, § 3, at 1. 
 44. In the movie Wall Street, the character Gordon Gekko, addressing a shareholder 
meeting, states, “I am not a destroyer of companies.  I am a liberator of them!  The point is, 
ladies and gentlemen, that greed, for lack of a better word, is good.  Greed is right, greed 
works.”  WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987). 
 45. See John Greenwald, Predator’s Fall, TIME.COM, Feb 26, 1990, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,969468,00.html (describing the collapse and 
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risks to world economic order grew as well.  The implosion of Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 demonstrated the 
potential international ramifications of an implosion in a single 
country.46  LTCM, a specialist in trading government bonds, employed 
derivatives to obtain significant leverage to significantly increase 
profits.  Unfortunately, the derivatives also added tremendous risk to 
LTCM’s portfolio, and when market conditions eroded, LTCM 
collapsed and had to be rescued to avoid banking and brokerage 
failures in the American financial system.  The Asian currency crisis 
of the late 1990s also demonstrated the perils of financial contagion, 
which is the risk that a financial crisis in one nation will spread and 
afflict the financial system of other nations.47  Financial contagion has 
been defined as “the cross-country transmission of shocks or the 
general cross-country spillover effects.”48 
B. The “New” Financial Fraud 
The “fraud bull” shows no sign of slowdown.  Indeed, scandals 
involving deceit in both American and international corporations are 
continuing at a torrid pace.49  However, it is crucial to appreciate the 
 
bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham); John K. Villa, That’s Where the Money is: Bank Crimes Move 
Beyond Robbery to Fraud, 9 BUS. L. TODAY 32 (May/June 2000), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/blt00may-money.html (“Many of the most serious problems 
uncovered in the S&L crisis involved insiders who phonied the books to make a sick financial 
institution appear healthy.  That was often accomplished by buying uncollectible loans out of 
the bank with the proceeds of new, and probably equally uncollectible loans, before the bank 
examiners arrived.”). 
 46. See Press Briefing, Int’l Monetary Fund, Press Conference on the IMF’s Annual 
International Capital Markets Report (Sept. 11, 2000), https://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2000/ 
tr000911.htm; see Wall Street Rescue for Hedge Funds, BBC NEWS, Sept. 25, 1998, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/179884.stm (“Long-Term Capital Management specialised in 
bond arbitrage, trying to exploit differences in the price of government debt in different 
countries.  It is believed to have lost heavily when Russia effectively defaulted on its short-term 
GKO bonds last month.  At the beginning of September it admitted that its capital base had 
shrunk by half, to $2.3bn.  But because of its use of so-called derivatives, the fund’s exposure 
was estimated at $40bn to $80bn—the sum total of the bets it had made around the world about 
the direction of bonds.”). 
 47. See Int’l Monetary Fund Staff, The Asian Crisis: Causes and Cures, FINANCE & 
DEVELOPMENT, June 1998, at 18, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/ 
06/pdf/imfstaff.pdf. 
 48. Contagion of Financial Crises, The World Bank Group (Sept. 15, 2000), 
http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/managing%20volatility/contagion/definitions.html#
broad. 
 49. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI): 
The FBI has not observed any major changes in criminal trends relating to Corporate 
Fraud.  It is anticipated that the number of cases will continue to flourish.  The FBI is 
committed to this problem.  It remains the #1 priority within the Financial Crimes 
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different nature of the current scandals as opposed to the impact from 
the “old financial fraud” of prior decades.  The “new financial fraud” 
is notorious for the depth of financial depravity and is qualitatively 
different.  The recent Enron scandal is one example of the impact of 
“new financial fraud”:  “In a matter of months, a bad crop of U.S. 
corporate executives incinerated trillions of dollars in wealth and 
destroyed the lives of thousands of innocent employees.”50  As world-
renowned financier Felix Rohatyn stated, the previous collapses 
“didn’t cost 50,000 jobs, people’s savings and a decline in market 
value of trillions of dollars . . . [t]his [situation] is not about a bunch of 
rogue CEOs.”51 
A review of a single day’s Wall Street Journal speaks volumes as 
to the extent of the financial scandal plaguing the world.  In only one 
day’s Wall Street Journal the following was reported:  the former 
CEO of Health South, Richard Scrushy, was convicted of bribery in 
his attempt to obtain a seat on a state regulatory panel;52 large 
companies Apple Computer and Computer Associates disclosed  
“irregularities” with respect to the dating of stock options to key 
executives;53 over fifty companies are being investigated by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and prosecutors with 
respect to option dating and numerous officers and directors have 
either been terminated or have resigned over these scandals;54 the 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission filed a complaint 
against BP PLC for purported manipulation of the propane futures 
 
Section.  There are presently 405 Corporate Fraud cases being pursued by FBI field 
offices throughout the United States.  This represents a 100 percent increase over the 
number of Corporate Fraud cases pending at the end of Fiscal Year 2003.  Eighteen of 
the current pending cases involve losses to public investors which individually exceed 
$1 billion.  The volume of cases has yet to reach a plateau, with three to six new cases 
being initiated each month. 
FINANCIAL CRIMES SECTION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FINANCIAL CRIMES 
REPORT TO THE PUBLIC: CORPORATE FRAUD (2005), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ 
publications/financial/fcs_report052005/fcs_report052005.htm#b1. 
 50. Editorial, Pinstripes to Prison Stripes, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at B-14. 
 51. Morgenson, supra note 43 (citing notable financier Felix Rohatyn and calling the Enron 
and WorldCom legacies a “greater and longer-lasting impact on the economy” than previous 
scandals because they involved “venerable financial institutions . . . at the heart of the . . . 
debacles”). 
 52. See Valerie Bauerlein, Scrushy is Convicted in Bribery Case—Prosecutors Savor Victory 
Over HealthSouth Ex-CEO After ‘05 Fraud Acquittal, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006, at A3. 
 53. James Bandler, Nick Wingfield & William M. Bulkeley, Apple and CA Report 
Problems in Options Grants, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006, at A3. 
 54. Id. 
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market;55 and alleged breaches of fiduciary duties on the part of senior 
management led to a prosecutorial raid on a South Korean Bank.56 
While such news underscores the frequency of financial 
gamesmanship, it is the high profile financial failures that have caused 
a sharp erosion of the public’s trust in corporations.  A cavalcade of 
high profile corporate failures has eroded corporate images 
worldwide.57  Well-respected firms, such as Enron, WorldCom, 
Healthsouth, Adelphia Communications, Royal Dutch, and many 
others,58 have placed a spotlight on the potential for corporate 
misconduct.59  There are even trading cards focusing on corporate 
scandal.60 
In addition, while most attention is usually riveted to the huge 
losses stemming from the plunge in share prices, that loss may be 
dwarfed by non-stock market losses.  Indeed, although equity and 
debt markets are very significant, there are other serious financial 
ramifications such as lost salaries, lost retirement savings, increased 
foreclosures, and lower values for real estate.  The income reduction 
due to job destruction may dwarf the losses in equity and debt 
markets. 
1. Examples of the “New” Financial Fraud.  The surge in highly 
unethical behavior is not relegated to one particular type of fraud or 
one particular genre of defendant.  The diversity of actors is 
substantial and ranges from traders, banks, junior level employees,  
 
 55. See Chip Cummins, A Glimpse Inside BP Trading—Documents in Fresh Complaints 
Reveal Dealing-Room Strategies; Sharing of ‘Lessons Learned,’ WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006, at 
C1. 
 56. See Jeongjin Lim & Lina Yoon, Prosecutors Raid South Korea Bank—Move Against 
KEB Comes After Audit Finds Fault With 2003 Sale of Lender, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006, at 
C3. 
 57. Corporate scandals involving corporations such as WorldCom and Enron have led to a 
substantial distrust of corporations.  See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley: A Price Worth Paying?, THE 
ECONOMIST, May 19, 2005, at 70, available at http://www.economist.com/business/display 
Story.cfm?story_ id=3984019. 
 58. For example, in October 2005, approximately two months after going public, the 
commodities trading firm Refco filed for bankruptcy due to an accounting scandal.  The Refco 
bankruptcy is believed to be the fourth largest to date.  Large amounts of public investor money 
were lost and confidence in the market was lessened.  See Eric Dash & Jenny Anderson, How a 
Big Investor Fell into the Refco Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at C4. 
 59. See generally REBECCA SMITH & JOHN R. EMSHWILLER, 24 DAYS: HOW TWO WALL 
STREET JOURNAL REPORTERS UNCOVERED THE LIES THAT DESTROYED FAITH IN 
CORPORATE AMERICA (2003). 
 60. David Plotz, Corporate Scandal Trading Cards: Collect ‘Em All, SLATE, July 19, 2002, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2068382/. 
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and law firms to the highest echelon of corporate management.61  
Rogue financial traders have set up fake trades purportedly making 
money while in truth losing billions.62  International banks have 
committed fraud to the tune of billions.63 
WorldCom management perpetrated a huge financial hoax 
through accounting fraud totaling over $3 billion.64  Once the second 
largest communications corporation, WorldCom executives 
committed fraud and deceived investors on a grand scale.65  
WorldCom’s financial problems led to the firing of seventeen 
thousand employees and caused severe economic dislocation.66 
Another multi-billion dollar accounting fraud was perpetrated by 
large hospital chain owner HealthSouth.67  This involved 
manipulation of the corporation’s financial records and the 
fabrication of accounting entries.68 
The biggest corporate scandal of 2005 was the collapse of Refco 
months after issuing equity shares to the public.  Refco was a major 
 
 61. See, e.g., supra notes 52, 58; infra notes 64, 90-101 and accompanying text; Crisis 
Meeting Over $750m Bank Fraud, BBC NEWS, Feb. 8, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/business/1806431.stm (noting that Allied Irish Banks suffered a nearly one billion dollar 
fraud-related loss).  Enron’s principal outside counsel, Vinson & Elkins (V&E), was sued on the 
basis that the firm participated with and helped Enron with respect to its corporate fraud.  See 
generally In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivatives & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 
2002).  V&E moved to dismiss the claims but the court refused, holding that the firm could 
potentially be liable.  Id. at 704-05.  V&E settled the litigation for $30 million.  The Associated 
Press, Vinson & Elkins to Pay Enron $30 Million to Settle Claims, LAW.COM, June 2, 2006, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1149152717089.  Other prestigious law firms are also 
being sued for their alleged involvement in the fraudulent schemes of their clients.  The 
National Law Journal, Creative Litigation Ensnares Outside Counsel in Shareholder Suits, 
LAW.COM, Jan. 24, 2006,  http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id=1138023312254 
(describing allegations that law firms representing Refco and Adelphia Communications aided 
their clients to commit fraud). 
 62. See William Leith, How to Lose a Billion, THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 26, 2002, at 
34, available at http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,3604,818620,00.html. 
 63. Jill Treanor, BCCI Settlement Costs Top $1.2bn, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 15, 
2003, at 18, available at http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,3604,956218,00.html; see also 
Japan’s $1-Billion Scam, ASIAWEEK, Oct. 27, 1995, available at http://www.asiaweek.com/ 
asiaweek/95/1027/biz2.html (describing fraud at Japan’s Daiwa bank). 
 64. WorldCom’s Woes, FORBES.COM, Aug. 9, 2002, http://www.forbes.com/2002/06/26/ 
worldcom.html. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Carrie Johnson, 5 Years for HealthSouth Fraud, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2005, at D01. 
 68. See Fifth Chief Financial Officer at HealthSouth to Admit Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 
2003, at C13; Milt Freudenheim, HealthSouth Audit Finds as Much as $ 4.6 Billion in Fraud, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at C2; Reed Abelson, HealthSouth’s Bondholders Await Ruling, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at C1. 
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commodities and futures contracts brokerage with 200,000 
customers.69  In August 2005, Refco went public at $22 a share and the 
shares jumped twenty-five percent in one day.70  The market 
capitalization was approximately $4 billion.71  Although Refco 
claimed $75 billion in assets at the time of its initial public offering 
(IPO), in October 2005, it subsequently conceded assets of $16 
billion.72  Shortly after going public, Refco admitted that an internal 
audit revealed a $430 million receivable owed to Refco by an entity 
controlled by CEO Phillip Bennett.73  Bennett is alleged to have 
engaged in off-setting transactions with a hedge fund client of Refco 
at the end of each quarter to keep the bad debt off Refco’s books.74  
Eventually, Refco filed for bankruptcy.75  In March 2006, it became 
known that Refco had $525 million in worthless bonds in offshore 
accounts.76  Creditors alleged that Bennett had been fraudulently 
maintaining the firm’s records for years.77  Refco shares during 
January 2007 were trading at around forty cents.78  At least one 
mutual fund has been adversely affected.79 
Corporate fraud is not limited to American MNCs.80  According 
to SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman, “corporate scandals were 
not specific to the United States.  With the revelation of fraud and 
corporate governance abuses at Parmalat, Hollinger, Royal Ahold, 
and others, it became apparent that the issues and need for reform 
raised by the U.S. scandals were in fact confronting the markets and 
regulatory regimes globally.”81 
 
 69. Abelson, supra note 68. 
 70. Refco, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Refco (last visited Aug. 7, 2006). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See OTC Bulletin Board Info Center, http://www.otcbb.com/asp/Info_Center.asp 
(search “Symbol” for “RFXCQ”) (last visited Jan. 7, 2007). 
 79. Alistair Barr, Rydex Sphinx Fund Hit by Refco demise, MARKETWATCH, Dec. 30, 2005, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/ (search for “Rydex Sphinx fund hit by Refco demise”). 
 80. See An Enron Plea That Reverberates, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2004, at F02 (calling the 
recent European scandals the “Chapter 2” to Enron’s “first chapter in the corporate 
scandal saga”). 
 81. Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm’n, Remarks before the 
European Corporate Governance Summit, An SEC Commissioner’s View: The Post-Sarbanes-
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Europe’s Parmalat now stands under investigation for the 
“disappearance” of 10 billion, earning the Italian giant the nickname 
“Europe’s Enron.”82  The British securities authority has accused 
Royal Dutch Shell of “‘unprecedented misconduct’ for misleading the 
markets over the reporting of oil and gas reserves.”83  The company 
has admitted that it overstated its future reserves of crude oil—the 
lifeblood of an energy corporation’s future revenue—by twenty-five 
percent.84  During the trading session following its admission, £3 
billion was wiped off its market capitalization.85 
Another recent scandal has earned a company the title “Enron of 
Spain.”86  Allegedly, a Spanish postage stamp company assured stamp 
buyers “guaranteed annual returns of six to ten percent in their stamp 
collection investments, depending on how many years they held the 
stamps.”87  Evidently, these stamps could be bought for “one-tenth” 
of what the company valued the stamps.88  “The allegation is that 
rather than earning investment returns, early investors were simply 
being paid out of revenues that later investors brought to the party—
essentially a Ponzi scheme.”89 
2. Enron’s Conduct and Impact.  While the above examples 
illustrate the rampant scandals of recent years, Enron Corporation’s 
machinations, and subsequent collapse, provides the archetype 
example of conduct that should be cognizable under the ATCA.  The 
 
Oxley Environment for Foreign Issuers (Mar. 2, 2005), (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch030205cag.htm). 
 82. Deborah Hargreaves, Market Insight: Impact of ‘Europe’s Enron’ Pales Next to the 
Original, THE FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 2004, at 44.  
 83. Terry Macalister, Shell’s Shame: FSA Spells out Abuse, THE GUARDIAN (London), 
Aug. 25, 2004, at 22, available at http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,3604,1290141,00.html. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Richard Behar, ‘Enron of Spain’ Fallout Ripples Into U.S. Markets, FOXNEWS.COM, 
June 8, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,198526,00.html (“Some experts are calling it 
the ‘Enron of Spain,’ the biggest financial scam that country has ever known.  A Spanish 
prosecutor has warned it might have ‘grave repercussions for the Spanish economy.’  And now, 
the shock waves are rippling into U.S. markets, where the full effects are still unknown.”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  “Ponzi schemes are a type of illegal pyramid scheme named for Charles Ponzi, who 
duped thousands of New England residents into investing in a postage stamp speculation 
scheme back in the 1920s . . . Decades later, the Ponzi scheme continues to work on the ‘rob-
Peter-to-pay-Paul’ principle, as money from new investors is used to pay off earlier investors 
until the whole scheme collapses.”  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Ponzi” 
Schemes, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2007). 
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Enron fraud is one of the biggest financial debacles ever and has 
served to focus attention on the outrageous fraud committed by some 
corporate behemoths.90 
The defunct energy trader was a major employer91 and at its 
zenith, the seventh-largest corporation in America.92  Enron shares 
were a highly touted investment and considered by many well-
respected analysts and commentators as a “must own” stock.  Fortune 
listed Enron as one of “10 Stocks to Last the Decade.”93  Fortune also 
praised Enron “as America’s most innovative firm for five years 
running.”94  In 1999, CFO Magazine named Enron’s Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO), Andrew Fastow, “CFO of the Year.”95 
While Enron appeared to be in excellent financial health—a 
highly successful corporation creating a surge in wealth for both 
investors and employees alike96—the truth was quite the opposite.  
Enron was not a giant profit generator, but was rather involved in a 
myriad of deceptions and frauds.  The more spirited and creative 
outrageous misconduct of Enron includes:  creating a fake trading 
area to deceive analysts, business partners, and investors;97 recording 
fraudulent transactions intended to simultaneously hide substantial 
losses and create large imaginary profits;98 and establishing a myriad 
 
 90. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Nancy B. Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Skilling: How 
Enron’s Public Image Morphed from the Most Innovative Company in the Fortune 500 to the 
Most Notorious Company Ever, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 77 
(Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004); KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF 
FOOLS: A TRUE STORY (2005). 
 91. Prior to bankruptcy, Enron employed nearly twenty thousand people.  See Dan 
Ackman, Enron the Incredible, FORBES.COM, Jan. 15, 2002, http://www.forbes.com/2002/01/15/ 
0115enron.html. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Fortune described Enron as possibly continuing with a twenty-five percent per year 
increase in earnings, in part because of broadband.  David Rynecki, 10 Stocks to Last the 
Decade, FORTUNE, Aug. 14, 2000, at 118. 
 94. William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 
1275, 1276 (2002). 
 95. Russ Banham, The Finest in Finance: Andrew S. Fastow, Capital Structure Management, 
CFO MAG., Oct. 1, 1999, at 62. 
 96. Enron claimed its sales rose from $13 billion in 1996 to $100 billion in 2000 and claimed 
they would double again by 2002, which would have made it the world’s second biggest 
corporation in terms of sales.  See Ackman, supra note 91. 
 97. Jason Leopold, Questioning the Books: Enron Executives Helped to Create Fake 
Trading Room, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, at A4 (“Former Enron Corp. Chief Executive Ken 
Lay and former President Jeff Skilling were personally involved in stage-managing a fake 
trading room to impress analysts.”). 
 98. See Bratton, supra note 94, at 1286 (examining Enron’s use of special purpose entities 
to fraudulently conceal losses and generate earnings). 
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of sham offshore entities to both evade fraud detection and to record 
non-existent earnings.99  Eventually the fraud became public, and 
soon thereafter Enron filed for bankruptcy.  As a result of the fraud, 
Enron’s shares became nearly worthless, causing tremendous loss to 
investors, wiping out employees’ retirement savings that in many 
cases constituted their life’s savings, eviscerating thousands of jobs, 
and resulting in overall severe long-term financial ruin for thousands 
of families.100  The brazenness of Enron’s top management was 
breathtaking:  “Enron’s principals abused the system in plain view, 
taking advantage of the considerable slack it extends to successful 
actors.  Although they did not disclose everything, they disclosed 
more than enough to put the system’s layers of monitors on notice 
that their earnings numbers were soft and their liabilities 
understated.”101 
A dramatic example of the smoke and mirrors used by Enron 
was the presentation of Enron Energy Service’s (EES) purported 
“war room.”  The “war room” was a surreal Hollywood-like 
environment where analysts and investors were shown an illusion of a 
booming, hugely profitable business:  a massive open space room, 
throngs of employees all seemingly intensely working on the phone or 
at desks or staring at computer screens, allegedly finalizing 
transactions and making profitable trades.102  Huge overhead screens 
showed the sites of EES’s many purported contracts and prospects.  
Real-time commodity prices were displayed on a continuous basis.103  
“It was impressive,” according to Merrill Lynch stock analyst John 
Olson.104  Unfortunately for Enron’s business partners, employees, 
and investors, the EES “war room” was bogus.  The entire sham 
trading room had been staged.  The visitors to the “war room” were 
 
 99. David Barboza, Ex-Executives Say Sham Deal Helped Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 
2002, at A1 (discussing Enron’s use of sham deals to meet year-end profit targets). 
 100. Former Enron employees have suffered severe financial hardship including losing their 
retirement savings, being forced to return to work after retirement, and home foreclosures.  See 
Julie Appleby, Many Who Lost Savings, Jobs Pleased, USA TODAY, May 26, 2006, available at 
http://usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/2006-05-25-enron-workers-usat_x.htm (“After 
Enron went bankrupt in 2001, [Rinard, a former Enron employee] and his wife, Vicki, had to 
sell their home and buy a much smaller one.  Like many other former Enron employees, they 
gave up plans for travel, retirement and helping the grandkids.”). 
 101. Bratton, supra note 94, at 1283. 
 102. Leopold, supra note 97. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Olson raised questions concerning Enron and was fired by Merill Lynch.  BETHANY 
MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND 
SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 180 (2003). 
04__SLAWOTSKY.DOC 3/9/2007  10:05 AM 
2006] THE NEW GLOBAL FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE 147 
deluded into believing what they observed was accurate.105  Top 
management was convicted of defrauding the public in violation of 
numerous federal laws.106 
III.  FINANCIAL CONTAGION 
American titans of capitalism can no longer be considered 
immune from the effects of foreign-based financial scandals.  World 
capital markets, the foundation of financial growth, are, in essence, 
moving forward toward international financial integration.107  For 
example, the New York Stock Exchange and Euronext are merging.108  
Unlike 1975, there is now a realistic danger of a domino effect as an 
“Enron-type” fraud may cause a financial storm to spread to the 
United States from overseas.  Leading academic institutions have 
established programs to study financial contagion.109  As stated by the 
European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, 
Higher levels of integration and concentration are increasing the 
number of cross-border financial institutions, which raises 
challenges in controlling and managing systemic risk.  Financial 
stability was traditionally a national responsibility, but these new 
market structures mean that there is a need for greater 
international co-operation, information exchange and, where 
appropriate, formal arrangements.110 
The European Commissioner added, “The corporate scandals of 
recent years and the fallout that they created underlined how 
interdependent our economies really are.  It is our job as regulators to 
come up with frameworks that, to the extent possible, bring about 
 
 105. Id. at 179-80.  See also Leopold, supra note 97. 
 106. See Christopher Palmeri, Guilty Verdicts for Enron Brass, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, 
May 25, 2006, http://businessweek.com/investor/content/may2006/pi20060525_754989.htm. 
 107. See Lee, supra note 14, at 10 (“Modern banks conduct diversified operations across 
borders to diversify their earning sources and enhance their profits.  Advances in data 
processing and telecommunications have enabled banks to offer global services easily, even 
without establishing a physical presence in some markets.”); see also Pierre Fleuriot, Financial 
Regulation As the Safeguard of Balances in a Global Context, in FINANCIAL MARKETS 
REGULATION 33, 33 (Alain Jeunemaitre ed., 1997). 
 108. See NYSE Group, NYSE Group and Euronext Agree to Merge, http://www.nyse.com/ 
about/newsevents/1149243292355.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); see also supra notes 30-31 and 
accompanying text. 
 109. See, e.g., Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance, Research Projects, 
http://www.cerf.cam.ac.uk/research/index.php?current=4 (last visited June 22, 2006). 
 110. Charlie McCreevy, European Comm’r for Internal Mkts. and Servs., Opening Address 
to the 4th INFINITI Conference on International Finance: Globalization and Financial Services  
 (June 12, 2006), (transcript available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
Reference=SPEECH/06/365&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en). 
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financial stability and reduce the risk of contagion of financial 
crises.”111 
An example of this concern arose from the fallout from Enron’s 
financial collapse.  Enron Australia’s liquidation led to concern and 
speculation regarding the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association’s model documentation for derivative transactions.112  
Another illustration of concern over financial contagion is in the 
realm of global banking.  With regard to the interconnection among 
banks, there is substantial concern that the insolvency of a major 
foreign banking enterprise may cause U.S. banks to also fail.113  Due 
to the tremendous increase in global finance and banking 
commencing in the late 1970s and 1980s, Congress recognized that 
banking regulation must incorporate an international consensus on 
capital adequacy ratios.114  Congress assigned the responsibility of 
capital adequacy to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
by enacting the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 
(ILSA)115:  “ILSA was a direct response to the international debt 
crisis and its impact on the U.S. banking system.”116  ILSA permitted 
the Federal Reserve to develop, negotiate and implement, in 
conjunction with foreign central banks, capital adequacy standards 
and the adoption of uniform rules for commercial banks.117  This 
emphasis on international agreement was an acknowledgement that 
the Federal Reserve’s power to prevent domestic financial implosions 
was limited and insufficient without agreement with foreign central 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Christopher J. Mertens, Australian Insolvency Law and the 1992 ISDA Master 
Agreement—Catalyst, Reaction and Solution, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 233, 233 (2006). 
 113. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Framework for Foreign-Back Insolvency: An Open 
Research Agenda, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 81 (2005). 
 114. OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms: Capital Adequacy Ratio, http://stats.oecd.org/ 
glossary/detail.asp?ID=6193 (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (“The capital adequacy ratio is an 
analytical construct in which regulatory capital is the numerator and risk-weighted assets is the 
denominator.  The minimum ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets is set at 8 percent 
(the core regulatory capital element should be at least 4 percent).  These ratios are considered 
the minimum necessary to achieve the objective of securing over time soundly-based and 
consistent capital ratios for all international banks.”). 
 115. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1153, 1278 
(1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 116. SUSAN BURHOUSE ET AL., BASEL AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL REGULATION: 
MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK (2003), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/ 
011403fyi.html. 
 117. See International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 908, 97 Stat. 
1153, 1278 (1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
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banks.118  The continued recognition of the growing risk to the global 
economy due to banking integration led to the 1988 international 
agreement by central bank governors of the Group of Ten (G-10) 
countries on capital adequacy known as the Basel Capital Accord and 
a current proposed Basel II.119 
IV.  ACTA LITIGATION 
A. The Alien Tort Claims Act 
Despite existing for over two hundred years, the ATCA had 
been, until 1980, a “stealth statute” and rarely invoked.120  
Notwithstanding the brevity of its words,121 the statute has been found 
difficult to interpret.  One court noted that there is “complexity 
involved in the application of this cryptic statute in the context of a 
globalized economy and evolving international organizations.”122  The 
ATCA provides federal jurisdiction for any civil action by an alien 
and for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations123 or a 
treaty of the United States.124  The statute permits aliens to file claims 
against American and foreign corporations and individuals for select 
tortious conduct committed in foreign countries.125 
To be actionable, the tort must constitute a violation of the “law 
of nations”126 or violate a treaty of the United States.127  Conduct 
 
 118. See 1 MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER, REGULATION OF FOREIGN 
BANKS: UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL 4-4 (1995) (explaining that when the first “risk-
based capital proposal [by the Federal Reserve pursuant to ILSA] was issued for public 
comment in early 1986,” the consensus “emphasized the importance of achieving uniformity of 
capital standards with other countries”). 
 119. The Federal Reserve Board, Basel II Capital Accord, http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
generalinfo/basel2/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2006). 
 120. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting the dearth of cases 
that had previously arisen pursuant to the ATCA). 
 121. ACTA reads, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by 
an alien for tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 122. Maugein v. Newmont Mining, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D. Colo. 2004) (rejecting 
defamation of character as actionable under the ATCA). 
 123. There is no bright-line test and courts have grappled with the issue of which torts are 
cognizable. 
 124. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 125. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720-21 (2004). 
 126. See Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 14 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Flores v. S. Peru Copper 
Corp., 406 F.3d 65, 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (depublished). 
 127. Flores, 406 F.3d at 79. 
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violates the “law of nations” if it contravenes “well-established, 
universally recognized norms of international law.”128  These norms 
must be “specific, universal and obligatory.”129  If a norm is binding on 
nations it is referred to as a “jus cogens.”130  A jus cogens violation 
satisfies, but is not required to meet, the ATCA requirement.131  
Therefore, a tort can be cognizable if the conduct violates a treaty or 
a universally acknowledged norm of international law, whether or not 
the norm is a jus cogens. 
Many torts have been rejected as predicate offenses permitted 
under the ATCA.  Non-compliance with a particular form of 
representative government is not considered a violation of the law of 
nations.132  Brief arbitrary detention has also been found not 
actionable.133  Sexual violence by itself has been rejected.134 
Courts have held that seizure of property within a nation’s 
borders does not constitute a violation, unless the actor is acting 
under color of law.135  Examples of commercial conduct that courts 
have specifically held not actionable because they failed to meet the 
standard of international consensus include fraud,136 conversion,137 
negligence and wrongful death,138 defamation,139 child custody,140 and 
libel.141 
1. Modern History of ATCA Litigation.  The current wave of 
ATCA litigation can be traced to the Second Circuit’s landmark 
decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.142  In Filártiga, the central issue was 
 
 128. See Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 
630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980)).  
 129. In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 130. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 945 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 131. Id. at 945 n.15. 
 132. Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F. 3d 145, 151 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 133. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004). 
 134. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 135. See Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 448-49 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(f) (1987)). 
 136. Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 137. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 138. Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 139. Maugein v. Newmont Mining Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D. Colo. 2004). 
 140. Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 141. Akbar v. New York Magazine Co., 490 F. Supp. 60, 63 (D.D.C. 1980). 
 142. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).  In Filártiga, two members of a Paraguayan family brought 
suit against a former Paraguayan police inspector for the torture and death of a third family 
member.  Id.  The court held that “deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official 
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whether torture constituted a “violation of the law of nations,” thus 
allowing plaintiffs’ ATCA suit to proceed.143  If the plaintiff could 
establish an international consensus with respect to torture’s illegality 
pursuant to customary international law, the torture claims would be 
actionable. 
Filártiga held that to be cognizable pursuant to the ATCA, a 
norm of international law must constitute a universal mutual 
concern144:  “It is only where the nations of the world have 
demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, 
concern, by means of express international accords, that a wrong 
generally recognized becomes an international law violation within 
the meaning of the [Alien Tort Statute].”145  The court held that to be 
a cognizable claim, the international law violation must be one that is 
universally condemned.146  Pursuant to Filártiga, only concerns of a 
mutual dimension, rather than one of several concern, will be 
cognizable. 147 
In analyzing whether torture was a violation of international law, 
the court found that the “law of nations” is not rigid, but flexible, and 
reflects an evolving standard of international law.148  The Second 
Circuit noted that new norms of customary law may arise:  “[T]he 
courts are not to prejudge the scope of the issues that the nations of 
the world may deem important to . . . their common good.”149  This 
 
authority” violates the law of nations, and that ATCA jurisdiction was proper.  Id at 878.  In 
arriving at this holding, the court interpreted Supreme Court precedents as establishing four 
propositions:  first, the law of nations is part of federal common law, and cases arising under the 
law of nations arise under the laws of the United States as required by Article III of the 
Constitution, see id. at 880; second, the “law of nations ‘may be ascertained by consulting the 
works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of 
nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law,’” id. at 880 (citing United 
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)); third, a norm must command “the 
general assent of civilized nations” to be part of the law of nations, see id. at 881 (citing The 
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)); and fourth, the law of nations must be interpreted 
“not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today,”  id. 
at 881 (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 198 (1796)). 
 143. Id. at 878. 
 144. See id. at 888. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See generally id. 
 147. Id.  Similarly, in Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., the Second Circuit stated that “the law 
of nations” in ATCA litigation refers to customary international law, meaning “those rules that 
States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.” 
343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (depublished). 
 148. See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 887. 
 149. Id. at 888. 
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broad and flexible definition meant that new torts might become 
actionable if there developed an international acknowledgement with 
respect to the conduct.  The court also held that torture was 
actionable under the ATCA.  Significantly, Filártiga’s far-reaching 
implication was endorsed by the Supreme Court.150  Filártiga was 
followed by several high-profile cases against both foreign nationals 
and corporations.151 
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court confirmed the 
ATCA as a potential vehicle to remedy certain outrageous conduct.152  
Rejecting the expansive view of the ATCA argued by plaintiffs’ 
counsel, the Court ruled the ATCA was jurisdictional and did not 
provide a statutory cause of action.153  However, the Court found the 
ATCA did vest federal courts with the power to hear violations of the 
law of nations, which is incorporated into federal common law, 
thereby providing the cause of action in ATCA litigation.154  The 
Court found that the scope of the claims authorized by that statute 
was limited,155 and approved a conservative approach to ascertaining 
the precise violations actionable under the ATCA.156  The Court 
limited § 1350 (the ACTA) to suits that “rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity comparable” to the torts recognized by the First 
Congress as violating the law of nations.157  The paradigm violations 
noted by the Court were offenses against ambassadors, violations of 
safe conducts, and piracy.158  However, the Court, citing Filártiga, held 
that international law violations must be evaluated in terms of current 
norms, not the norms of the eighteenth century.159  Lower courts were 
 
 150. See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text. 
 151. See Joel Slawotsky, Doing Business Around the World: Corporate Liability Under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1065, 1074-76 (discussing post-Filártiga cases). 
 152. 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004).  The Court underscored the validity of the ATCA in Rasul v. 
Bush, where the Court affirmed that the prisoners detained at Guantánamo might potentially 
use the ATCA to file actions.  542 U.S. 466 (2004).  Thus, according to the Court, aliens 
detained as terror suspects may bring suit against U.S. officials for violations of international 
law.  Id. at 468. 
 153. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713. 
 154. Id. at 720. 
 155. Id. at 724. 
 156. Id. at 725. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 720.  Some have argued that terrorism is substantially equivalent to piracy.  See 
Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Terrorism is a colorable claim under the 
ATCA.). 
 159. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
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provided with the ability to approve previously unrecognized torts if 
the conduct becomes the subject of universal concern.160  Following 
Sosa, major corporations continued to face ATCA litigation,161 with 
many of the cases demonstrating a continued difficulty in applying the 
ATCA, causing the courts to issue conflicting rulings.162 
2. The Law of Nations.  When plaintiffs base their ATCA 
claims on the law of nations, rather than on a treaty, they must 
demonstrate that defendants’ conduct breached a universal norm of 
international law,163 meaning a norm that is “specific, universal and 
obligatory.”164  A norm is universal and obligatory if:  (1) no state 
condones the act in question and there is a recognizable universal 
consensus of prohibition against it; (2) there are sufficient criteria to 
determine whether a given action constitutes an occurrence of the 
prohibited act and thus violates the norm; and (3) the prohibition is 
non-dirigible and thus binding at all times upon all persons.165  
The law of nations “results from a general and consistent practice 
of states which is followed by them from a sense of legal 
obligation.”166  Sosa did not articulate an easy method for courts to 
 
 160. See id. 
 161. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (international oil 
company defendant); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(ATCA claims against American chemical corporations); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 
F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (banking defendants). 
 162. Courts have arrived at conflicting decisions on a variety of ATCA issues.  Compare In 
re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (war crimes and crimes against humanity 
have no statute of limitations), with Cabello v. Fernández-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(statute of limitations on ATCA claims is ten years); also compare Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 
F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005) (torture is not actionable under the ATCA), with In re Estate of 
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.1994) (torture actionable under 
the ATCA); also compare In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 52 (ATCA encompasses 
aiding and abetting liability), with In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 538 
(ATCA is limited to direct liability). 
 163. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he ATS 
applies only to shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized principles of 
international law . . . .  [Plaintiff] fails to show that these treaties and agreements enjoy universal 
acceptance in the international community.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (“It is only where the nations of the 
world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual and not merely several, concern, by means 
of express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international 
law violation within the meaning of the statute.”). 
 164. Beanal, 197 F.3d at 165. 
 165. See generally In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1475. 
 166. Jama v. U.S. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998) (“The law of nations ‘may be 
ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the 
general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that 
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interpret the law of nations.  Indeed as one court stated, “it would 
have been unquestionably preferable for the lower federal courts if 
the Supreme Court had created a bright-line rule.”167 
Despite this, courts will usually have jurisdiction if plaintiffs can 
allege an international law violation of joint, rather than several, 
concern, as evidenced by agreements and regulations.168  In evaluating 
whether a specific claim meets the jurisdictional requirements of the 
ATCA, a court will consider:  (1) whether the complaint identifies a 
specific, universal, and obligatory norm of international law; (2) 
whether that norm is recognized by the United States; and (3) 
whether there has been a violation of the same.169  Courts faced with 
making this determination may be guided by judicial decisions 
enforcing the law of nations, the work of jurists, and the general usage 
and practice of nations.170  Courts may also look at non self-executing 
treaties and international agreements to determine accepted norms of 
international law.171 
B. The ATCA and Corporate Fraud 
1. Rulings on Fraud Prior to Vencap.  Historically, courts have 
been reluctant to expand ATCA liability into the commercial realm.  
The case often cited as the initial authority for this refusal is the 
nearly fifty-year old holding in Lopes v. Schroder.172  In Lopes, the 
court found that the unseaworthiness of a ship was not actionable 
 
law.’”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102(2) (1987). 
 167. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 547. 
 168. Courts may disagree over what constitutes “universal acceptance” under international 
law.  Compare Mendonca v. Tidewater, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301-02 (E.D. La. 2002), aff’d, 
33 F. App’x. 705 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that racial discrimination does not violate the law of 
nations because the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination does not enjoy 
“universal acceptance”), with Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 439-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(“Systematic racial discrimination . . . is proscribed as [a] violation[] of international standards 
in various international instruments.”). 
 169. See Nat’l Coal. Gov’t. of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 170. Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1999); Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 
714-15 (9th Cir. 1992); In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 
1160, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
 171. Sarei v. Rio Tinto P.L.C., 456 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2006) (“As for the UNCLOS 
[United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] claim, the treaty has been ratified by at 
least 149 nations, which is sufficient for it to codify customary international law that can provide 
the basis of an ATCA claim.”). 
 172. 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
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pursuant to the ATCA.173  The Lopes court found the principle of 
unseaworthiness was not a universal concern but rather a doctrine of 
American law, or, a several concern of the United States.174  Lopes 
noted that the only torts cognizable under the ATCA were those 
affecting nations generally, or, those of a joint concern.175  Since 
unseaworthiness was not part of the law of nations, it could not be a 
predicate for filing suit under the ATCA.176 
Similarly, in Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,177 the 
court decided that an American insurance company’s allegedly 
fraudulent conduct in refusing to pay the proceeds of an insurance 
policy to a foreign plaintiff did not constitute a violation of the law of 
nations.178  The court, citing Lopes, rejected ATCA jurisdiction, 
stating, “A violation of the law of nations means a violation of those 
standards by which nations regulate their dealings with one another 
inter se.”179  The court noted that the “personal injury actions such as 
those found in the Lopes case do not raise the specter of widespread 
international impact [and similarly] actions to recover funds based 
upon life insurance contract obligations do not impress this Court as 
being of the caliber of the cases which have been allowed recourse” 
pursuant to the ATCA.180 
In Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, Inc., plaintiffs claimed that the 
defendant oil corporation committed fraud against them.181  They 
alleged that the defendant promised to train them as company 
managers, but instead trained them to be employed as service station 
attendants.182  The court held that the purported deception failed to 
constitute a tort in violation of the law of nations and was thus not 
actionable under the ATCA.183 
 
 173. See id. at 295. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. at 297. 
 176. See id. (holding that the torts cognizable under the ATCA include violations “of those 
standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an 
individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in 
dealing inter se”). 
 177. 259 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1966). 
 178. Id. at 327. 
 179. Id. at 328. 
 180. Id. (emphasis added). 
 181. 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 182. Id. at 143-44. 
 183. Id. at 145.  See also Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 
1978) (holding that air crashes do not fall within the ambit of the ATCA after plaintiff estate of 
a victim of an airplane crash filed a tort action against an airline for wrongful death). 
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2. The Second Circuit’s Vencap Ruling.  While the above-
referenced cases demonstrate the historical reluctance of courts to 
permit ATCA claims based upon commercial liability, the Second 
Circuit’s ruling in Vencap is particularly important because it has 
been cited as precedent for cases holding corporate fraud not 
cognizable under the ATCA.184  In Vencap, a foreign investment fund 
filed suit against a foreign corporation for “fraud, conversion, and 
corporate waste.”185  The court held that although conduct leading to 
fraud was universally condemned,186 to be actionable, the conduct 
must constitute a violation of the law of nations.187  The Second 
Circuit, noting that the law of nations “must be narrowly read,”188 held 
that while laws against theft are part of the legal system of many 
states,189 theft was not a violation of the law of nations pursuant to 
the Lopes standard.190  Citing to Lopes, Vencap stated a violation of 
the law of nations arises when “[a] violation by one or more 
individuals of those standards, rules, or customs [occurs] (a) affecting 
the relationship between states or between an individual and a 
foreign state and (b) used by those states for their common good 
and/or in dealings inter se.”191 
According to Vencap, the international financial fraud at issue 
was not actionable since the conduct failed to constitute a violation of 
international law.192  While Vencap was not sanctioning fraud, it found 
that the factual underpinning of the particular claim failed to 
constitute a universal concern.193 
 
 184. See, e.g., Arndt v. Union Bank of Switz., 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); 
Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995); DeWit v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 
570 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding an employment dispute not actionable). 
 185. ITT v. Vencap, 519  F.2d 1001, 1003 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 186. Id. at 1015 (referencing the prohibition against theft in the Ten Commandments). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. (citing Lopes v. Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963)). 
 192. Id. at 1015.  Filártiga v. Peña-Irala referenced Vencap and noted Vencap’s statement 
that even if every nation’s law forbids theft, that would not mean that “the Eighth 
Commandment, ‘Thou Shalt not steal’ . . . [is incorporated into] the law of nations.”  630 F.2d 
876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015). 
 193. See Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015. 
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In Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a 
dismissal of claims that banking fraud violated the law of nations.194  
The court held that “looting of a bank by its insiders, and 
misrepresentations about the bank’s financial condition, have never 
been in the traditional classification of international law.  These are 
garden variety violations of statutes, banking regulations, and 
common law.”195  The Hamid court cited to Vencap and held that the 
fraudulent conduct did not violate the law of nations.196 
In Arndt v. Union Bank of Switzerland, the court reiterated that 
financial fraud was not actionable under the ATCA.197  The court 
conceded that the question of whether a tort violates customary 
international law “has found no easy answer.”198  Nevertheless, the 
court, citing to Vencap and several other cases,199 joined other courts 
in holding fraud not actionable.200  The Arndt court concluded that the 
fraud in the case did not constitute “‘wrongs’ expressed by mutual 
concern and reflected in ‘international accords.’”201  Arndt stated that 
to be actionable the violation must be of a rule:  “(1)‘universally 
recognized’ by states; (2) establish[ing] a legal obligation; (3) 
address[ing] wrongs that are of mutual, and not merely individual, 
concern to states; and (4) specific enough to be enforced.”202 
 
 194. 51 F.3d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the complaint alleged that defendants 
violated the law of nations by causing the bank to loan money to criminals and to insiders and 
bribing or lying to bank regulators). 
 195. Id. at 1418. 
 196. Id. (citing Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015).  The court stated: 
We agree with the view of the Second Circuit, as stated in IIT:  we cannot subscribe to 
plaintiffs’ view that the Eighth Commandment “Thou shalt not steal” is part of the law 
of nations.  While every civilized nation doubtless has this as a part of its legal system, 
a violation of the law of nations arises only when there has been “a violation by one or 
more individuals of those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship 
between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those 
states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se.” 
 Id. 
 197. 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 198. Id. at 138. 
 199. Id. at 139-40 (citing Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 142, 145 (7th Cir. 1973); 
De Wit v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 570 F. Supp. 613, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Canadian 
Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania De Acero Del Pacifico, 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982)). 
 200. Id. at 139-41.   
 201. Id. at 141 (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(depublished)). 
 202. Id. at 139 (citing Flores, 343 F.3d at 154-56; Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d 
Cir. 1980)). 
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The post-Vencap rulings are not persuasive for three reasons.  
First, these courts have not paid attention to Filártiga’s specific 
notation that the law of nations may change over time, thus leaving 
the possibility that over time, corporate fraud may become the 
subject of mutual concern, thereby constituting a violation of an 
international norm.203  Second, the violations this Article suggests as 
being cognizable are not routine fraud but rather the type of conduct 
which involves “the specter of widespread international impact”204 
and leads to an “Enron-like” financial collapse, where substantial 
wealth is destroyed, accompanied by other severe loss such as 
elimination of thousands of jobs and tremendous collateral economic 
damage.  Third, as will be demonstrated below, by the very standards 
articulated by Filártiga, Flores, and Arndt, severe corporate fraud now 
satisfies the criteria of international mutual concern for finding 
jurisdiction under the ATCA. 
V.  REASONS TO MOVE BEYOND AN AUTOMATIC 
FINDING OF NO LIABILITY 
Today’s international financial problems—corporate accounting 
and fraud, terrorism, organized crime, money laundering, banking 
failures, and securities fraud—are universally recognized wrongs of 
mutual concern.205  Severe financial fraud that could lead to mega-
meltdowns is a substantial joint concern expressed in international 
agreements, cooperation, and accords.  Indeed, the prevention of 
financial fraud is the subject of numerous international agreements, 
and cooperation, and is recognized as a pillar of maintaining global 
financial order.  All civilized nations have a significant self-interest in 
maintaining economic order and the prevention of financial fraud is 
now a universal concern.206 
Across the globe, government institutions have formed networks 
of their own, ranging from the Basel Committee of Central Bankers 
 
 203. See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 881. 
 204. Valanga v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966). 
 205. See generally E. Anthony Wayne, Internationalizing the Fight, EJOURNAL USA 6 (Sept. 
2004), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0904/ijee/ijee0904.pdf (discussing the 
Global War on terrorism finance). 
 206. See generally infra notes 236-65 (referencing the specific international agreements and 
accords listing corporate fraud as a major global concern and developing methods to combat 
such activity). 
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to ties between law enforcement agencies and securities regulators.207  
These concerns over corporate fraud are (1) recognized universally; 
(2) establish legal requirements; (3) relate to obligations that are of 
mutual concern; and (4) specific and enforceable.208  Therefore, under 
the very governing standards articulated by Filártiga, Vencap, and 
Arndt, “Enron-like” corporate criminal fraud should be actionable 
under the ATCA. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Approval of the Second Circuit’s Holding 
that the Law of Nations Must Adapt to New Conditions 
1. The Filártiga Holding that International Law Evolves with 
Changing Conditions.  In the Second Circuit’s Filártiga ruling, the 
court stated that to be actionable under the ATCA, the conduct must 
constitute a violation of an international norm that reflects a concern 
to all nations.209  The court stated that a norm must “command the 
‘general assent of civilized nations’” to be part of the law of nations 
and that the law of nations must be interpreted “not as it was in 1789, 
but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world 
today.”210 
The crucial holding in Filártiga was the acknowledgement that 
norms of international law do change over time.  The court was 
saying in effect that what might not be a violation of international law 
today might be so held in the future. 
2. The Supreme Court’s Endorsement of Filártiga.  In Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court specifically commented with 
approval on Filártiga, leaving no doubt that the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation that the law of nations evolves over time is the correct 
approach.  The Court held:  “The position we take today has been 
assumed by some federal courts for 24 years, ever since the Second 
 
 207. See General Information on IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about (last visited Aug. 7, 
2006) (outlining the basic purposes of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 
which are:  (1) “to cooperate together to promote high standards of regulation in order to 
maintain just, efficient and sound markets;” (2) “to exchange information on their respective 
experiences in order to promote the development of domestic markets;” (3) “to unite their 
efforts to establish standards and an effective surveillance of international securities 
transactions;” and (4) “to provide mutual assistance to promote the integrity of the markets by a 
rigorous application of the standards and by effective enforcement against offenses”). 
 208. Id. 
 209. See 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 210. Id. at 881 (emphasis added). 
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Circuit decided Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.”211  Sosa held that in 
determining the viability of new actions, “we think courts should 
require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a 
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and 
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-
century paradigms we have recognized.”212 
In addition to the Supreme Court’s validation of the “evolving 
law” approach, there is a U.S. Congressional endorsement.  In 
enacting the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), Congress 
enhanced the ATCA through the TVPA, but explicitly stated that the 
ATCA “should remain intact to permit suits based on . . . norms that 
already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary 
international law.”213 
Based on the Supreme Court’s endorsement of Filártiga and the 
legislative intent of Congress, conduct that may not have been 
cognizable under the ATCA at one time may become actionable at a 
later date.  While courts have been reluctant to find corporate fraud 
an actionable tort,214 the Supreme Court has endorsed an approach 
whereby torts other than the three original predicate offenses are 
cognizable.215 
In deciding whether to find reprehensible conduct actionable 
under the ATCA, the issue is whether the conduct is a violation of the 
law of nations.  Does corporate fraud that causes severe financial 
collapse constitute conduct that engenders the condemnation of the 
civilized world, thus qualifying it for a violation of an international 
norm?  As will be discussed below, concerns about egregious financial 
fraud and global economic stability have indeed ripened in recent 
years and are now universal. 
B. Avoiding Financial Collapse is an International Norm 
Deterring foreign-based corporate criminal fraud is an issue of 
mutual concern.  Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, addressing claims of corporate misconduct, opined that 
allegations of corporate fraud “undermine the very basis on which the 
 
 211. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004). 
 212. Id. at 725. 
 213. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (emphasis 
added). 
 214. See, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015-16 (2d Cir. 1975); Arndt v. Union Bank of 
Switz., 132 F. Supp. 2d 132, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 215. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730-31. 
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world’s greatest financial markets thrive.”216  The losses involved in 
egregious financial misconduct are no longer containable to a 
particular nation.  There is a universal consensus that avoiding 
financial collapse is a shared mutual interest of all civilized nations.  
The entire international community has a paramount interest in 
preventing staggering loss and the ATCA should be a vehicle to help 
deter such fraud. 
Anti-corruption initiatives, barely in existence until the last 
several years, have reached a critical mass.217  The International 
Organization of Security Commissions (IOSCO), an organization 
composed of over one hundred members,218 has several working 
groups, one of which is focused on multinational disclosure and 
accounting.219  In February 2005, the IOSCO reported that the 
integrity and foundation of the global economy was in danger due to 
rampant high-profile corporate fraud worldwide.220  The IOSCO 
Report commented that these corporate scandals were not confined 
 
 216. The Associated Press, Greenspan: Companies Must Restore Trust, MSNBC.COM, Apr. 
16, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4757117/. 
 217. See, e.g., Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. 
Department of State,  Anticorruption Timeline Fact Sheet, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/ 
31263.htm (last visited June 22, 2006) (listing international conferences and meetings focused on 
combating corruption). 
 218. Ordinary Members of IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_members.cfm? 
memID=1&orderBy=none (last visited Sept. 25, 2006). 
 219. See IOSCO Working Committees, http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section= 
workingcmts (last visited Sept. 25, 2006). 
 220. TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, STRENGTHENING CAPITAL 
MARKETS AGAINST FINANCIAL FRAUD ii (2005), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/ 
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD192.pdf.  The report stated: 
Over the past several years, a series of very high-profile financial scandals involving 
large publicly-traded companies appeared to create doubts in the minds of investors 
throughout the world about the integrity of global capital markets.  While, at first, the 
largest of these scandals seemed limited to the United States, more recent events—
including the December 2003 discovery of financial improprieties at Parmalat S.P.A. in 
Italy followed by other scandals in various jurisdictions—demonstrated that this 
phenomenon was not peculiar to any one market and the concerns raised by these 
financial scandals were truly global in nature.  Members of the Technical Committee of 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions recognize that these investor 
doubts must be answered if financial stability and economic prosperity are to be 
maintained.  Consequently, the Technical Committee formed a Task Force of 
Chairmen charged with investigating the issues uncovered by these financial scandals 
and identifying any broad trends.  It was also tasked with making recommendations 
about the enhancements securities regulators should undertake to ensure that the 
current regulatory framework remains robust and serves to protect the integrity of 
global capital markets, restore investor confidence, and combat financial fraud, 
notwithstanding significant changes in the marketplace. 
Id. 
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to any particular jurisdiction, but rather were global in nature.221  The 
report also emphasized that the entire global economic structure was 
at risk to of collapse due to financial fraud.222  As will be 
demonstrated below, the prevention of corporate fraud and 
avoidance of financial collapse is a universal concern. 
C. The United States 
The United States recognizes that economic security forms a 
crucial underpinning of overall national security.  Indeed, the Secret 
Service’s second directive, after protection of the President, is the 
safeguarding of the American financial system.223  Congress enacted 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), which regulates 
the foreign activities of U.S. companies.224  The FCPA contains 
specific accounting provisions225 that require proper recording of 
transactions and disposition of assets.226  Interestingly, in an 
amendment, Congress required the President to consult with other 
nations and negotiate an international agreement on fighting 
corporate corruption.227  This emphasis on international cooperation 
underscores that corporate fraud is not a several concern but a 
universal one. 
In the wake of Enron and other scandals, the Corporate Fraud 
Task Force (CFTF) was created by Executive Order in July of 2002.228  
The CFTF was established to direct the prosecution of serious 
financial crimes and formulate recommendations on preventing major 
corporate fraud.229  In addition, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX)230 to reform corporate governance vesting regulators with 
broad powers to impose new accountability rules on senior 
 
 221. Id. 
 222. See id. 
 223. See United States Secret Service, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.secret 
service.gov/faq.shtml (last visited June 20, 2006) (“Today, the Secret Service’s mission is two 
fold:  protection of the President, Vice President and others; and protection of our nation’s 
financial system.”). 
 224. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 225. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(b) (2000). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,  
§ 5003(d)(1), 102 Stat. 1415, 1424 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 228. Exec. Order. No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. § 13271 (2003). 
 229. Id. 
 230. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
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management,231 to deter fraudulent financial statements,232 and to 
improve public accounting oversight mechanisms.233  SOX codifies 
financial crime as a federal criminal violation.234  Significant fines and 
penalties are contained in SOX.235 
D. International Concern 
As concerns over financial wrongdoing have spread globally,236 
many countries and international organizations have articulated 
concerns about corporate mischief that could cause financial 
implosion on a global scale.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
has been involved in stabilizing nations involved in financial 
meltdowns.237  The IMF has declared that corporate fraud and 
corruption are destabilizing to the global economy and has adopted 
guidelines to avoid financial meltdowns and to improve 
transparency.238  The World Bank has established the Oversight 
Committee on Fraud and Corruption,239 runs integrity workshops,240 
and urges reporting of fraud.241 
The IOSCO has articulated regulatory principles and standards 
of auditor oversight, corporate governance, and transparency in an 
attempt to prevent financial fraud.242  The IOSCO is working with the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD),243 as well as other international organizations and law 
 
 231. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 7243-7244 (Supp. III 2003). 
 232. See, e.g., § 7241. 
 233. See § 7211. 
 234. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (Supp. III 2003). 
 235. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. III 2003); see also Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron 
to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 378-79 
(2003) (providing examples of criminal penalties in tables 1 and 2). 
 236. See James Cox, Asia Shakes Up Cozy, Corrupt Business Practices, USA TODAY, Jan. 
28, 1998, at 4B. 
 237. See What the IMF Does, http://www.imf.org/external/work.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 
2006). 
 238. See News Brief, IMF, IMF Adopts Guidelines Regarding Governance Issues (Aug. 4, 
1997), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1997/nb9715.htm. 
 239. The World Bank Group, Helping Prevent Corruption World-Wide, http://www.world 
bank.org/html/extdr/spring99/corruption-pb.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006). 
 240. See id. 
 241. See id. 
 242. See TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 220, at ii-iii. 
 243. The OECD responded to the spreading concern over international bribery by passing 
the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business 
Transactions.  Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business 
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enforcement agencies in an attempt to encourage international 
cooperation against corporate fraud.244  The IOSCO notes that today’s 
global economy demands international cooperation in the fight 
against financial machinations.245 
In 1989, the Group of Seven major industrialized nations 
organized to discuss money laundering and set up the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF).246  The FATF drafted recommendations 
that are regularly updated to reflect changing financial conditions.247  
The FATF defines certain categories of offenses that reflect 
international norms.  Included in this list of criminal misconduct are: 
fraud, piracy, and market manipulation, as well as other offenses.248  
The FATF’s recommendations are a reflection of the world’s mutual 
concern about improper financial conduct.  
In 1996, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed the 
Inter-American Convention against Corruption (OAS Convention).249  
The OAS is a multinational organization representing nearly forty 
nations.250  The OAS Convention requires parties to the Convention 
to consider the applicability of measures within their own system 
requiring corporations to maintain accurate financial records251 and 
provide transparency.252 
The goals of the European Community Securities Law are to 
protect investors and to ensure uniform standards.253  This requires an 
avoidance of financial crisis that can erode the stability of the market.  
The European Union (EU) utilizes Directives, conventions, and 
 
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,2340,en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 244. TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 220, at v, vii, ix, 
29. 
 245. Id. at 29 (“These scandals have been notable not just because of their cross-border 
nature of the alleged wrongdoing, but also because of the cross-border enforcement cooperation 
among securities regulators and law enforcement authorities that followed.”). 
 246. See About the FATF, www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2966,en_3225039_32236836_1_1_1_1_ 
1,00.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2006). 
 247. Id. 
 248. See FATF, 40 Recommendations Glossary, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/glossary/0,2586,en_ 
32236889_35433764_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006). 
 249. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 
105-39, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html. 
 250. About the OAS, http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas. 
org/documents/eng/memberstates.asp (last visited Nov. 29, 2006). 
 251. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 249, art. III, cl. 10. 
 252. See id. art. III, cls. 4,5,9,10, art. XVI. 
 253. Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The 
Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT’L L.J. 185, 215 (1990). 
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regulations to advance these goals.  Some examples of Directives are 
ones that require certain financial information to be published254 and 
ones that require financial disclosures to be reviewed by qualified 
auditors and establish professional requirements of the auditors.255  
Other Directives prohibit companies from deluding the market with 
inaccurate or misleading information256 or obligate disclosure and 
transparency rules.257  Another example of a European Directive is 
the Interim Reports Directive, which mandates that companies which 
have publicly traded shares provide semi-annual balance sheets to 
provide investors with information.258 
European nations have also expressed their concern about fraud 
generally with the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of the 
Council of Europe.259  Other examples are the various EU directives 
and agreements aimed at preventing corporate fraud and money 
laundering.260  Serious fraud and corruption are considered criminal 
activities. 
The U.N. General Assembly has established an ad-hoc 
committee to investigate the viability of a U.N. convention against 
corruption.261  In addition, the Declaration against Corruption and 
Bribery in International Commercial Transactions has become a U.N. 
Resolution.262  The Resolution encourages nations to establish anti-
corruption measures.263 
 
 254. Council Directive 83/349, art. 7(2)(b)(bb), 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1, 4 (EEC). 
 255. Council Directive 84/253, arts. 2-6, 1984 O.J (L 126) 20, 21-26 (EEC). 
 256. Council Directive 2003/6, art. 2(c), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16, 20 (EC). 
 257. See Council Directive 2004/39, art. 25, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 21 (EC). 
 258. Alexander B. St. John, The Regulation of Cross-Border Public Offerings of Securities in 
the European Union: Present And Future, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 239, 246 (2001). 
 259. See Criminal Law Convention on Corruption pmbl., Jan. 27, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 173. 
 260. See Financial Crime, The EU Single Market, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
company/financial-crime/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2006). 
 261. See generally U.N. Gen. Assembly [UNGA], Ad Hoc Comm. for the Negotiation of a 
Convention Against Corruption, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a 
Convention Against Corruption on the Work of Its First to Seventh Sessions, ¶ I, U.N. Doc. 
A/55/422 (Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention_corruption/ 
session_7/422e.pdf; UNGA, Ad Hoc Comm. for the Negotiation of a Convention Against 
Corruption, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against 
Corruption on the Work of Its First to Seventh Sessions, Addendum: Interpretative Notes for the 
Official Records (Travaux Préparatiores) of the Negotiation of the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption, U.N. Doc. A/58/422/Add.1 (Oct. 7, 2003), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention_corruption/session_7/422add1.pdf. 
 262. G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/191 (Dec. 16, 1996). 
 263. Id. ¶ 3. 
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As detailed above, concerns over corporate fraud have led to 
widespread international agreement and cooperation on corporate 
financial abuse over the last thirty years.  These concerns are not 
relegated to one or two nations, but rather are joint and mutual as 
evidenced by universal consensus and substantial agreement.264  The 
fight against corporate fraud reflects concerns that:  “(1) [are] 
‘universally recognized’ by states; (2) establish a legal obligation; (3) 
address wrongs that are of mutual, and not merely individual, concern 
to states; and (4) [are] specific enough to be enforced.”265  It is beyond 
peradventure that civilized nations share a mutual concern regarding 
the avoidance of corporate fraud.  As evidenced by the accords and 
agreements of leading global organizations, such as the IMF, World 
Bank, and others, as well as the laws and international cooperation of 
many nations, financial misconduct that leads to a mega-meltdown 
and collapse constitutes a violation of an international norm. 
E. Select Enron-Type Conduct 
It is crucial to note that this Article is not suggesting that conduct 
encompassing ordinary market risk or garden-variety fraud should be 
actionable pursuant to the ATCA.266  Only outrageous conduct with 
an international impact and which results in severe wealth destruction 
should be actionable under the ATCA.  The category of claims 
suggested in this article capable of triggering jurisdiction are limited 
to “Enron-like” fraud. 
 
 264. See, e.g., TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 220, at 
iii.  The report states: 
[I]n modern capital markets, where capital flows easily across national borders, cross-
border enforcement cooperation perhaps is the single most powerful tool securities 
regulators and law enforcement authorities have at their disposal to prevent, deter, 
detect and prosecute cross-border financial fraud.  In the process of reviewing the key 
regulatory issues highlighted by these recent financial scandals, the Technical 
Committee determined that, in many cases, regulatory principles or standards designed 
to address the weaknesses identified in this Report have already been developed.  In 
other words, the Technical Committee is of the view that, in very many cases, there 
already is a widespread consensus about what regulatory problems exist and how these 
problems can be solved. 
Id. 
 265. Arndt v. Union Bank of Switz., 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Flores 
v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 154-56 (2d Cir. 2003) (depublished) and Filártiga v. Peña-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 266. Market risk is the “risk of losses in on- and off-balance-sheet positions arising from 
movements in market prices.”  BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, OVERVIEW OF THE 
AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS 1 (1996), available 
at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs23.pdf. 
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CONCLUSION 
Recent years have witnessed a surge in global financial deception 
resulting in substantial wealth evisceration.  While the types of 
conduct found to be cognizable under the ATCA to date have not 
included severe corporate financial wrongdoing, these prior rulings 
do not reflect our current financially intertwined world.  Powerful 
reasons exist for permitting the invocation of ATCA jurisdiction in 
limited circumstances for corporate financial misconduct.  The 
quintessential example of the type of deception where ATCA 
jurisdiction is appropriate is the conduct that caused the Enron 
debacle. 
Avoiding “Enron-like” financial implosions, failed banking 
systems, the evisceration of tens of billions of dollars worth of market 
value, the destruction of retirement savings on a grand scale, 
plummeting real estate valuations, and economic collapse based upon 
corporate fraud constitutes an international norm.  All countries have 
a crucial interest in maintaining world economic prosperity.  The 
foundation of world economic stability is at stake.  Since 
globalization, the financial services revolution, and global market 
integration have brought these negative outcomes from being 
confined locally to the specter of international contagion, the ATCA 
should be allowed to form the basis of jurisdiction for the Enron-type 
of corporate fraud. 
